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INTRODUCTION

One of the unfortunate byproducts of historic preservation laws is that upkeep and
adaptation of historic properties can be expensive. For example, the Boys and Girls Club of
Greater Washington had to spend $100,000 on wooden windows to conform to the implementing
regulations of the District’s Historic Preservation Act. That was a five-fold increase over the
price the Club had paid three years prior to install the same windows in vinyl. 1 In another case, a
church in New York City was forced to take on a financial burden of $4.5 million, or one third of
the church’s total endowment, to adapt its landmarked property. 2
Taking these financial burdens into account can be difficult for non-profit landowners, 3
whose motive is community service rather than commercial gain. In some jurisdictions, courts
and city councils have taken steps to modifying analysis of “takings” claims or economic
hardship claims under the historic preservation law, for these owners. 4 These changes provoke
two questions. Are these analyses analogous to takings claims made by commercial owners?
What facts could a non-profit owner produce that would support a takings claim?
There are argument supporting creation of an alternate standard for takings claims
brought by non-profit owners. Ultimately, however, legislative bodies possess the discretion to
set standards in historic preservation laws, within the outer bounds of the constitutional standard
1

Decision and Order of the Mayor’s Agent, HPA #02-421 (8 Aug. 2003).
St. Bartholomew’s church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (1990).
3
Most of the landowners discussed in this paper are churches or charities, all share tax-exempt status and a common
motive of community service. Unless further distinction is necessary, all will be referred to simply as “non-profit
owners” in this paper.
4
All landowners have the option of contesting burdensome regulations under the “takings” clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution. The amendment provides a list of protections from government action, and end by
stating “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Regulations that “go too far”
may “take” property under this amendment, just as if the government had taken physical possession of the land,
according to Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Economic hardship claims are claims made
under local historic preservation laws. The standard that must be met for each claim is essentially the same. Where
the distinction is unnecessary, this paper will refer simply to takings claims.
2
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for a taking. No standard has yet emerged that clearly moves away from the constitutional level.
This paper will examine how a number of jurisdictions treat the takings standard for non-profit
organizations, and will suggest ways of clarifying and improving the law. Part I discusses Penn
Central, 5 which sets the high national standard to for takings claims. This section also discusses
how local governments have incorporated that standard into historic preservation laws as
economic hardship claims. Part II analyzes how some jurisdictions make a distinction between
commercial and non-profit owners in takings claims, and what claimants must demonstrate to
succeed in making a claim. Part III concludes by examining the competing rationales supporting
and opposing the creation of a modified standard. It also proposes recommendations for future
development in this field.

I. THE PENN CENTRAL STANDARD IN TAKINGS CLAIMS
A. The Constitutional Takings Standard
The legal standard for when a government regulation, including a historic preservation
law, “goes too far” 6 and works a taking of a property was set in the Supreme Court’s 1978
decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 7 The case arose from the
application of New York City’s Landmark Preservation Law to the Grand Central Station. The
station was designated a landmark in 1967. 8 The next year, Penn Central Transportation Co.
(Penn Central), the owners of the station, submitted two proposals for additions to the building to

5

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
260 U.S. at 415.
7
438 U.S. 104. Penn Central is a historic preservation case as well as a takings case. The case is discussed here for
its significance as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that clause of the Fifth Amendment. The case also provides
an example of the application of the Landmarks Law to commercial properties. Because the focus of this paper is on
application to non-profit properties, however, the paper discusses only cases applying the non-profit owner
provision of the Landmarks Law in Part II
8
Id. at 115.
6
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the Landmark Preservation Commission. 9 Both were designed by famed architect Marcel
Breuer, and featured a modern, 55-story skyscraper, one standing over and one replacing the
façade of the original beaux-arts building. 10 Both were rejected. 11 Penn Central then asserted a
claim in state court that application of the Landmark Preservation Law amounted to a taking of
their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, as applied via the
Fourteenth Amendment. 12 Following appeals through the New York Courts, the Supreme Court
held that the historic preservation law did not effect a taking of the plaintiff’s property because
the owners could still derive a reasonable economic return on their investment in the land. 13 The
Court applied an “ad hoc, factual inquir[y]” to determine when a taking has occurred. 14 Three
factors guide this inquiry, the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” the “extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations,” and the
“character of the governmental action.” 15 The factors apply to the entire property under the
regulation. 16 Owners must show more than that they are burdened to a greater extent than
landowners whose properties are not historic.

17

Analyzing Penn Central’s claims under this

framework, the Court found that the company’s investment-backed expectations were not dashed
by the Commission because the station could continue operating as it had, profitably, for the past
60 years. Merely showing any limitation on use, especially hypothetical, future expansion, is

9

Id.
Id. at 116-17.
11
Id. at 117. The Commission emphatically rejected the applications, terming the juxtaposition of styles an
“aesthetic joke.”
12
Id. at 119.
13
Id. at 138.
14
Id. at 124.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 131-32.
17
Id. at 130-38.
10
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insufficient to demonstrate that a taking has occurred. 18 Additionally, the rejected proposals did
not preclude award of a building permit for a more compatible plan.19 The regulation’s
economic impact was likewise acceptable under the Fifth Amendment. In a footnote, the court
recognized that a taking would be recognized if the law so restricted the property that it “cease[d]
to be economically viable.” 20 The station could continue to turn a profit, and expansion
compatible with the Landmark Preservation Law was not precluded, so Penn Central could
achieve a reasonable return on the property even though it might have earned more from its
proposed expansions. The government regulation, finally, was more regulatory than physical in
nature.
Later cases clarified the regulatory “takings” inquiry. Cessation of economically viable
use has been affirmed as the high showing claimants must make. In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council 21 , for instance, the Court considered a claim that a regulation denying any
building on beachfront property in parts of South Carolina took 100% of the value of the land.
The Court agreed that the regulation denied “all economically viable use.” 22 In such rare cases,
the Court will consider the regulation a per se taking. 23 If not, the Penn Central factor test is
applied, but the practical outcome of this test is still to require a near-wipeout showing to tip the
scales in the claimant’s favor. 24
B. The Standard for Economic Hardship under Historic Preservation Laws

18

Id. at 130 (stating “the submission that appellants may establish a; taking’ simply by showing that they have been
denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development is
quite simply untenable.”).
19
CITE—late in case
20
Id. at 138 n.36.
21
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
22
Id. at 1016.
23
Id. at 1029.
24
E.g. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (refusing to
classify temporary moratoria as per se takings, and instead applying the Penn Central balancing test to reject the
takings claim).
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The Landmark Preservation Law enacted in New York City is an early example of a local
preservation law, adopted in 1965. After Penn Central upheld the ability of the city to preserve,
many more local jurisdictions enacted their own preservation laws. 25 These laws typically
require review of new construction, alteration or demolition permits for designated landmarks or
contributing buildings in historic districts. 26 Work affecting the exterior of the protected
structure must be “compatible” with or “appropriate” for the historic character. 27 Frequently,
these also feature an “economic hardship” provision that provides an “escape hatch” if denial of
a permit would be extraordinarily burdensome. 28 These provisions usually set this level of
burden at the same level as a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment. 29

For example, in

New York, owners of commercial properties must demonstrate that their property is “not capable
of earning a reasonable return,” defined as six percent of the value of the parcel 30 and in the
District of Columbia, owners must show that the effect of the law would be to “amount to a
25

E.g. The Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978 of Washington, DC was passed the same
year as Penn Central was decided.
26
E.g. DC Code §§ 6-1103 to 1105 and 1107 (creating the Historic Preservation Review Board and specifying
procedures for demolition, alteration and new construction, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 25-304 to 312 (outlining the
Landmark Preservation Commission’s powers, procedures for obtaining certificates of appropriateness for
construction or demolition, regulation of minor work and emergency repairs),
27
Id. DC Code § 6-1101 states “that the purposes of this act are… [t]o assure that alterations of existing structures
… [and] new construction and subdivision of lots are compatible with the character of the historic district.” N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 25-307 provides “certificates of appropriateness” after considering “the effect of the proposed work
in creating, changing, destroying or affecting the exterior architectural features of the improvement upon which such
work is to be done” and “the relationship between the results of such work and the exterior architectural features of
other, neighboring improvements in the district.”
28
E.g. DC Code § 6-1102 (5)(e) (“Unreasonable economic hardship means that failure to issue a permit would
amount to a taking of the owner’s property without just compensation or, in the case of a low-income owner(s) as
determined by the Mayor, failure to issue a permit would place an onerous and excessive financial burden upon such
owner(s).” (emphasis in original)), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 25-309 (providing that a certificate of appropriateness
may be granted if “the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the commission that: (a) the improvement parcel
(or parcels) which includes such improvement, as existing at the time of the filing of such request, is not capable of
earning a reasonable return; and (b) the owner of such improvement: (1) in the case of an application for a permit
to demolish, seeks in good faith to demolish such improvement immediately (a) for the purpose of constructing on
the site thereof with reasonable promptness a new building or other income-producing facility, or (b) for the purpose
of terminating the operation of the improvement at a loss; or (2) in the case of an application for a permit to make
alterations or reconstruct, seeks in good faith to alter or reconstruct such improvement, with reasonable promptness,
for the purpose of increasing the return therefrom.”).
29
Id.
30
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 25-309, 302(v), Meredith J. Kane and Katharine L. McCormick, Historic Properties:
Hardship Relief Can Be Claimed under Certain Tests N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 2005, at 5 (col. 2).
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taking of the owner’s property without just compensation.” 31 In practice, meeting this standard
through evidence of financial burden has proved quite difficult for owners of historic properties.

II. APPLICATION OF THE TAKINGS STANDARD TO NON-PROFIT PROPERTY
OWNERS

A. The New York City Landmarks Law
New York has gone the farthest of any jurisdiction in creating a modified standard to
apply to owners of non-profit organizations, both in statutory and in case law The New York
City Landmark Preservation Law was enacted in 1965, and was upheld in Penn Central.

32

Under the Law, as previously mentioned, properties unable to earn a reasonable return of more
than six percent of their value may be awarded a certificate of appropriateness. The provision of
the city code continues, creating a separate “no reasonable return” category for owners of taxexempt properties. 33 This section allows non-profit to make the following showing:
(2) In any case where any application and request for a certificate of
appropriateness…is filed with the commission with respect to an improvement, the
provisions of this section shall not apply to such request if the improvement parcel…has
received, for three years…and at the time of such filing continues to receive [specified
tax exemptions for non-profits]… and the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the
commission, in lieu of the requirements set forth [for commercial properties] that:
(a) The owner of such improvement has entered into a bona-fide agreement to sell…or to
grant a term of at least twenty years…which agreement is subject to or contingent upon
the issuance of the certificate of appropriateness or a notice to proceed; (b) The
improvement parcel…, as existing at the time of the filing of such request, would not, if it
were not exempt in whole or in part from real property taxation, be capable of earning a
reasonable return; (c) Such improvement has ceased to be adequate, suitable or
appropriate for use for carrying out both (1) the purposes of such owner to which it is
devoted and (2) those purposes to which it had been devoted when acquired unless such
owner is no longer engaged in pursuing such purposes; and (d) The prospective
purchaser or tenant: (1) In the case of an application for a permit to demolish seeks and
intends, in good faith either to demolish such improvement immediately for the purpose
31

D.C. Code § 11-244 § 3(14) (2006).
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 25-301 to 322.
33
The code identifies landowners who qualify for this separate standard by their tax-exempt status. For the sake of
convenience, this note will continue to simply refer to these owners as charitable or non-profit.
32
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of constructing on the site thereof with reasonable promptness a new building or other
facility; or (2) In the case of an application for a permit to make alterations or
reconstruct, seeks and intends in good faith to alter or reconstruct such improvement,
with reasonable promptness.

The Landmarks Law has no legislative history. The legislature, however, must have felt
that non-profit owners merited a separate showing from commercial owners under the economic
hardship exception. The statutory text, however, provides no lower standard for non-profit
owners, who must still show that the property would fail to generate a reasonable return of six
percent “if it were not exempt… from…taxation.” Perhaps the drafters of the bill recognized
that a “takings” analysis could not be applied neatly to non-profit properties. No action was
taken, however, to shield these owners especially from the unevenly burdensome effects of the
landmarks law. The resulting standard demonstrates the discretion the city council has to
balance the goal of historic preservation with the goal of promoting non-profit services. Here, it
seems reasonable to maintain a high standard for economic hardship, especially recognizing that
these non-profits already enjoy tax-exempt status.
B. The Snug Harbor Standard for Charitable Use
The Landmarks Law provision of economic hardship for non-profit landowners requires
these owners to be prepared to sell their property or lease it for at least twenty years, contingent
on grant of a certificate of appropriateness, to receive relief under the economic hardship
provision. 34 Owners who wish to continue using their property have successfully argued for a

34

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 25-309(2)(a) (“the provisions of this section shall not apply…if… the applicant
establishes…that…[among other things] The owner of such improvement has entered into a bona-fide agreement to
sell an estate of freehold or to grant a term of at least twenty years in such improvement parcel, which agreement is
subject to or contingent upon the issuance of the certificate of appropriateness or a notice to proceed.”).; Meredith J.
Kane and Katharine L. McCormick, Hardship Relief Can Be Claimed Under Certain Tests, N.Y.L.J. 5, (col. 2) (Mar.
30, 2005) (“Owners of charitable property must instead make a showing that: (1) they have entered into a contract
to sell their property or lease it for a minimum of 20 years and such contract is contingent on the issuance of a
permit to demolish or substantially alter the property.”).

8

common law modification of the takings as applied in cases that develop under the Landmarks
Law. 35
1. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor v. Platt
The first case to establish this new standard was Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor v.
Platt, decided in 1968. 36 In that case, a “charitable organization,” a home for retired sailors,
filed for a demolition permit. 37 The home buildings owned by the organization, which were all
built before 1880, “ha[d] largely outlived their usefulness and… [could] no longer provide
suitable accommodations for the elderly men quartered in them.” 38 The home intended to build
modern buildings to house the elderly men the organization housed, feeling “it would be remiss
to its trust to fail to do so.” 39 Because the buildings had been designated historic landmarks, the
home needed to receive a certificate of appropriateness under the Landmarks Law, but the
certificate was denied because “in marked contrast to the [poor] accommodations provided by
the interiors of the buildings…their exteriors…were one of the two best examples of Greek
Revival architecture in the country and, as such, part of the aesthetic heritage of the nation.” 40
The home then asserted that the Landmarks Law “amounts to a taking” as applied to its
property. 41 The court first stated that a test for “undue economic burden” on commercial
properties “where the continuance of the landmark prevents the owner from obtaining an

35

Trustees of Sailors Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (“Chapter 8-A provides some
guidelines as to what constitutes an undue burden on commercial realty and provides relief in such instances (s 2078.0, subd. a). However, the corresponding provisions in regard to property devoted to charitable uses are limited to
the instance where the institution desires to alienate the property by sale or lease (s 207-8.0, subd. a par. (1), subpar.
(b), cl. (2)). We agree with Special Term that this does not render the statute unconstitutional. It must be interpreted
as giving power to the commission to provide relief in the situation covered by the statute, but not restricting the
court from so doing in others.”).
36
29 A.D.2d 376.
37
Id. at 377. (Plaintiffs will be referred to as “the home.”).
38
Id. at 377.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 378.
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adequate return.” 42 In contrast, “[a] comparable test for a charity would be where maintenance
of the landmark either physically or financially prevents or seriously interferes with carrying out
the charitable purpose.” 43 .Making this determination “would depend on the proper resolution of
subsidiary questions,” including “whether the preservation… would depend on the proper
resolution of subsidiary questions, would seriously interfere with the use of the property,”
whether changes to return the building to usefulness could be done “without excessive cost,” or
whether those changes would “entail serious expenditure,” evaluated “in the light of the purposes
and resources of the petitioner.” 44 This test pushes the distinction between commercial and nonprofit properties under the Landmarks Law further, but the decision did not clarify what showing
this “comparable” test requires. It is possible that this test provided an ‘escape hatch’ for nonprofit owners faced with significant financial burdens that draw funds away from their
organizational missions. However, the court also specified that the test would be “comparable”
to the commercial “takings” test, which suggests that the court was merely explaining how nonprofits should be analyzed under that test. The “charity” test announced in Snug Harbor was
outlined in broad terms 45 , and in later cases, courts have tended toward the latter suggestion;
Snug Harbor has provided a framework for analyzing the financial pressures of non-profit
owners, but does not “ease” the “takings” standard in any way.
2. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York
At first, it appeared that the New York courts might indeed provide an easier way around
the Landmarks Law by finding a taking under Snug Harbor, as the test was applied in Lutheran
42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
See Cindy Moy, Reformulating the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law’s Financial Hardship Provision:
Preserving the Big Apple, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 447) (noting that “What constitutes serious” in the term
“serious expenditures,” “what level of interference is permissible under the “seriously interferes” prong, or how
broadly and from when in the organization’s development “charitable purpose” is to be defined were all left open by
the court).
43
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Church in America v. City of New York. 46 This case concerned a landmarked Brownstown,
formerly the residence of J.P Morgan Jr., owned and used by “a religious corporation” in
midtown Manhattan. 47 Over time, “plaintiff's office space requirements increased to such an
extent that, even with the addition of a brick wing in 1958, the building became totally
inadequate.” 48 The court applied Snug Harbor, stating that it “ruled that where designation
would prevent or seriously interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose it would be
invalid. That is a simple enough concept and ought to apply here.” 49 The Lutheran Church court
held that because
it is uncontested that the existing building is totally inadequate… and must be replaced if
plaintiff is to be able freely and economically to use the premises…The power given the
municipality to force termination of plaintiff's free use of the premises short of
condemnation (which would provide compensation for plaintiff's complete loss) directly
violates plaintiff's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and [comparable provisions of] the New York Constitution…we find a
situation exceeding the permissible limits of the zoning power. 50
One note author has argued that because the opinion “suggests that an organization’s original
purposes are dispositive…the court failed to instruct upon how one ought to determine what is an
organization’s charitable purpose and what constitutes serious interference” under the Snug
Harbor test. 51 Following this logic, a court could define “charitable purpose” broadly or
narrowly, which in turn would increase or decrease the likelihood of “serious interference” with
that purpose. In defining the Church’s “legitimate needs,” however, the court cited the “ample
proof not seriously contested, that the use to which the property has been put for over 20 years
would have to cease because of the inability under the designation to replace the building.” 52
46

316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974).
Id. at 307.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 311.
50
Id. at 312.
51
Moy, supra at 460 (arguing that the court failed to address how charitable purpose ought to be determined).
52
316 N.E.2d at 310.
47
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While the court then held that application of the Landmarks Law to the property prevented the
plaintiffs from carrying out their charitable purpose, the use over a significant length of time
provided guidance in determining the church’s “charitable purpose.” The Lutheran Church
court, therefore, filled in some of the blanks left by the Snug Harbor decision.
3. The Society for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v. Spatt
In the next New York case to consider non-profit landowners under historic preservation
laws, The Society for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v. Spatt, 53 the court significantly
limited possibilities of a lower standard under Snug Harbor. In the case, a “religious,
educational and charitable organization” owned a landmarked Meeting House in Manhattan.
The Society applied for a demolition permit, arguing that “the physical structure of the Meeting
House [was] ill-adapted to its present needs.” 54 The permit was denied, and the Society asserted
a claim that its property was being “taken” under the Landmarks Law. 55 Despite the Society’s
argument, the reviewing court found that “petitioners' arguments [seemed] to emphasize
aggrievement with respect to the prohibition against high-rise development” and that “[t]here
[was] no genuine complaint that eleemosynary activities within the landmark [were] wrongfully
disrupted, but rather the complaint is instead that the landmark stands as an effective bar against
putting the property to its most lucrative use.” 56 The court applied the Snug Harbor test, but
refused to interpret the “substantial interference” language as anything more lenient than denial
of all reasonable use. The court held on these facts that “there simply is no constitutional
requirement that a landowner always be allowed his property's most beneficial use.” 57 The
Society for Ethical Culture court thus defined the “substantial interference” standard narrowly, as
53

415 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1980). (Plaintiffs will be referred to as “the Society”.).
Id. at 936.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
54
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comparable with the takings standard for commercial properties. The court also clarified its
understanding of the Snug Harbor test, stating that
“because charitable organizations are not created for financial return in the same sense as
private businesses, for them the standard is refined to permit the landmark designation
restriction only so long as it does not physically or financially prevent, or seriously
interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose.” 58
Although the questions that a court would ask in assessing a “takings” claim by a non-profit
owner had been “refined,” the measurement of the effect of the regulation on the historic
property was not disturbed by Snug Harbor.
4. St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York
The court in St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York 59 has gone the farthest to
date in New York in explaining what showing will support a takings claim under the Fifth
Amendment and the New York Landmarks Law. In this case, a “not-for-profit religious
corporation,” the Protestant Episcopal Church, owned two buildings in Manhattan, a Church and
a Community House, from which it ran education and charity services. 60 Both buildings were
landmarked in 1967. 61 In 1983, however, the Church applied for two “certificates of
appropriateness” for alteration of the Community House to replace it with a modern office
building, and both were rejected. 62 The Church also applied for a “hardship exception” to obtain
the “certificate of appropriateness,” and was denied. The Church then brought a claim that
application of the Landmarks Law effected a taking of its property under the Fifth Amendment,
as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment. 63

The court evaluated the Church’s claim under

Snug Harbor, and upheld the denials of the “certificate of appropriateness” because the Church
58

Id. at 454-55.
914 F.2d 348 (2nd Cir. 1990).
60
Id. at 351.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 352. The Church also asserted a “religious exercise” claim under the First Amendment that the court
considered at length. That claim, however, is not relevant to this paper.
59
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could not show that the financial burden of renovating the property consistently with the
Landmarks Law prevented the Church from “carrying out its charitable purpose in its existing
facilities.” 64 The Church could demonstrate that renovations necessary to continued operation
of the organization would be quite costly, 65 as much as $4,500,000. This amount represented
“approximately 41%” of the Church’s “estimated resources.” 66 Examining these figures, the
court concluded that “the Church ha[d] not adequately demonstrated that it [was] unable to meet
this expense.” 67 Further, the court suggested several options it felt were available to the Church
to finance renovations. These included gradual withdrawals from the Church’s endowment to
minimize impact, borrowing against the endowment, conducting a capital fundraising drive, and
exploring the value of transferrable development rights in the airspace above the Church
property. 68
The St. Bartholomew holding significantly narrows the Snug Harbor decision. Under the
court’s analysis of the Church’s financial burden it is conceivable that no claim would ever rise
to the level of a taking because creative options for funding will always exist. It is unclear just
how far this or any other court would take such an argument. For example, if the necessary
renovations had equaled or exceeded the total resources available to the Church, would the court
have found a taking, or would the court still have required the Church to borrow and conduct a
capital campaign? What is clear is that the Snug Harbor line of cases has not altered or reduced
the showing required of \non-profit owners in New York claiming a taking under the Landmarks

64

Id. at 353.
Actually, the district court below felt that the Church had some difficulty accurately estimating the cost of the
proposed repairs, and did not accept the Church’s original estimates and instead accepting a figure of $3,000,000.
Because the Church argued that at least another $1,500,000 would need to be spent, the Second Circuit uses the
$4,500,000figure in its analysis.
66
Moy, supra at 467.
67
914 F.2d at 359.
68
Id. The church claimed it had exhausted the fund drive option, although the court found evidence to the contrary,
and that the TDRs had no value, which the court also found contrary to other evidence.
65
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Law. Courts analyze non-profits’ takings claims separately from commercial properties, but
owners must meet a takings test fundamentally the same, regardless of their identity.
C. Takings Claims in Pennsylvania Courts
The Pennsylvania courts have largely declined to implement a modified standard for nonprofit landowners for takings claims under its historic preservation laws when they have been
presented with the opportunity to do so. For example, in First Presbyterian Church of York v.
City Council of York, 69 a Church applied for a demolition permit for York House, a building it
owned within a historic district in the central part of York. 70 Wear over time and a fire in 1972
meant that the House needed significant repairs, and the Church demonstrated that “the costs of
renovating York House for use by the Church would be $29,000, that the cost of repairing fire
damages…would be an additional $17,000 (against a still unspent insurance recovery of
$10,000) and that annual maintenance costs…would be about $12,500.” 71 The Church argued
that demolition was necessary because against its annual budget of $254,000, this burden would
effect a taking under the requirements of York’s historic preservation laws. 72 In denying the
Church’s claim, the Pennsylvania court considered applying the Snug Harbor test, which had
been used by the Board of Historical Architectural Review in the town of York, but ultimately
preferred to apply the test for a constitutional taking coming out of Maher v. City of New
Orleans 73 because that case also considered a historic district, as opposed to the single landmark
in Snug Harbor. 74 Maher provides a “reasonable return” test, requiring that the Church
demonstrate that “the ordinance went so far as to preclude the use of the property for any

69

360 A.2d 257 (Pa.Cmmw.Ct. 1976)
Id. at 259.
71
Id. at 260.
72
Id.
73
371 F.Supp. 653 (E.D.La. 1974)
74
360 A.2d at 161.
70

15

purpose for which it was reasonably adapted,” 75 and specifically to show that “sale of the
property was impracticable, that commercial rental could not provide a reasonable rate of return,
or that other potential use of the property was foreclosed.” 76 Because the Church in First
Presbyterian had not attempted to sell the property, the court held that they had not proved a
regulatory taking. 77 The court characterized the Snug Harbor test as “more stringent” and noted
that the Church would not meet that standard either. 78 The court did not elaborate, however, on
how Snug Harbor could be stricter than the constitutional standard for a “taking,” which
provides the baseline for all takings analyses. In essence, the court appears to have simply
considered and rejected Snug Harbor in favor of applying a more general “reasonable return”
standard to all properties.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied a straightforward “deprived of
any profitable use” standard in a case remarkably similar to the facts of Snug Harbor. In Park
Home v. City of Williamsport, a non-profit home for elderly women was operating in a Victorian
building designated a historic landmark. 79 The home applied for a demolition permit, desiring
to modernize its facilities. When the permit was denied, the home asserted that its property was
being “taken” without just compensation by the application of the Williamsport historic
preservation laws. 80 Because the home had not been offered for sale, however, the court
concluded that the plaintiff could not have met its burden of proving that “any profitable use”
had been deprived.
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D. The District of Columbia Historic Preservation Act
In the District of Columbia, the “economic hardship” standard has been considered at
length. In both statutory and case law, an “economic hardship” incorporates the takings standard
as defined by the Supreme Court. At points, lawmakers and adjudicators considered the effects
of this high standard on low-income landowners and on owners of non-profits, but no
modification in the required showing has emerged. The development of the law is useful for
considering what owners must actually demonstrate to prove a taking has occurred.
“Economic hardship” is defined in the Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection
Act (“Historic Preservation Act” or “Act”) as “amount[ing] to a taking of the owner’s property
without just compensation.” 82 An early version of the Act, dated two days after the Penn
Central decision, defined “undue economic hardship” as “the owner’s return from and use of the
property are unreasonably limited without fault of the owner.” 83 Later, however, the language
was changed to read “‘[u]nreasonable economic hardship’ means that failure to issue a permit
would amount to a taking of the owner’s property without just compensation.” 84 Notes reveal
that the Committee on Housing and Urban Development, who drafted the Act “designed [the
definition of “economic hardship”] to embody the constitutional standard as defined by the
United States Supreme Court.” 85 Because “economic hardship” tracks the constitutional
standard, “the precise legal boundaries of this definition may change from time to time as the
Court defines a taking for these purposes.” 86 At the time of enactment, therefore, “economic
hardship” would be defined “under the constitutional standards …most recently reaffirmed in the
82
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context of landmark legislation by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York … [that] the District of Columbia may place restrictions on land use without
compensation so long as the owner of the property is left with some reasonable use.” 87 The
Committee elaborated, stating that to meet the “economic hardship” standard,
a property owner will have to show that: (i) he cannot continue to use the property; and
(ii) he cannot sell the property for an amount which would give him a reasonable return
based on his actual investment; and (iii) he cannot sell the property for a price which
would not be confiscatory based upon his actual investment; and (iv) the property is not
suitable for adaptive reuse; and (v) his inability to use, rent, sell, or reuse the property is
not the result of his own fault. For example, because through his own failure of
maintenance the property has declined in value or become uninhabitable.88
Perhaps because the Committee noted that it was creating a “strict test,” 89 the “economic
hardship” definition was amended again. To the definition of “economic hardship” as a
“taking,” the Committee added language stating that “in the case of a low-income owner(s) as
determined by the Mayor, failure to issue a permit would place an onerous and excessive
financial burden upon such owner(s). 90 No explanation was recorded for the addition, so it is
unclear what the Committee intended to be an “onerous and excessive financial burden.” The
term could indicate that a “low-income owner” need not be burdened at the level of a taking to
demonstrate “economic hardship.” Some reasonable return on the property might be
permissible, so long as the financial burden remains great. The Committee also could have
intended to emphasize the importance of the “economic impact” of historic designation, one of
the three Penn Central factors, without changing how “economic impact” is measured. If this is
true, the addition seems to carry more political significance than legal significance. In the thirty
years following enactment of the law, no decision by the Mayor’s Agent has ever clearly found
87
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that economic hardship existed under the low-income owner standard. 91 Because there are few
meaningful indicators that this language changes the definition of “economic hardship,”
The “onerous and excessive financial burden” must fall on “low-income owner(s).” By
regulation, these are individual residential owners whose income is “eighty percent (80%) or less
of the median household income for the Washington Metropolitan Area.” 92 The individual
homeowners suggested by this definition are in a vastly different financial position than many
non-profit organizations, which can range from tiny groups on “shoestring” budgets to
international organizations like the Red Cross or the United Way. No indication exists that the
Committee considered non-profit owners as a special case, although it is clear that the
Committee compared the Act it drafted with the New York City Landmarks Law. 93
In subsequent cases arguing for economic hardship under the Historic Preservation Act,
the courts have kept to the clearly stated standard of a Fifth Amendment taking found in the Act.
900 G Street Associates v. Department of Housing and Community Development, 94 for example,
concerned a YWCA’s claim for a demolition permit under the economic hardship provision. the
plaintiffs argued that economic hardship had taken place because “the property had been
diminished in value by the [Act];…the value of the property…would be greater if the demolition
permit…were issued;…the Building…will be considered independently of any other property
owned by petitioner; and…no support or funding will be provided…for any renovation costs by
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governmental or private institutions.” 95 The DC Court of Appeals declined allowing these
factors to equal economic hardship, which incorporates the high takings standard. The court held
that
“if there is a reasonable alternative economic use for the property after the imposition of
the restriction…there is no taking, and hence no unreasonable economic hardship to the
owners, no matter how diminished the property may be in cash value and no matter if
‘higher’ or ‘more beneficial’ uses of the property have been proscribed. 96
“In particular,” the court also stated, an owner must show that show that “the sale of the property
was impracticable” to demonstrate that the property had “not provide a reasonable rate of return,
or that other potential use of the property was foreclosed.” 97 There is little doubt from this
language that the court is applying the full Fifth Amendment takings standard as announced in
Penn Central. 98 The court has even simplified application of the standard, succinctly stating
that the question is “whether there is any other reasonable economic use for the Building. If there
is, there has been neither a constitutional taking nor an unreasonable economic hardship
imposed.” 99
One of the goals of the DC Historic Preservation Act is “[t]o retain and enhance historic
landmarks in the District of Columbia and to encourage their adaptation for current use.” 100 In
furtherance of that goal, courts apply the takings standard incorporated into the Act, even though
non-profits may be forced to invest a great deal of its available funds in the upkeep of its historic
property, to sell its property and relocate, or to be forced out of existence.

III. Analysis
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Changing takings law for non-profit owners raises tension between two equally
legitimate goals of government in exercising its police power. These are the importance of
historic preservation and the importance of supporting private efforts to serve the community.
Both goals have great merit. Historic preservation has been recognized as playing an important
role in strengthening community ties. Preservation inspires patriotism and reminds the public of
the history of their location. Preservation recognizes and protects attractive and interesting
architecture and land planning. Preservation connects the community by transmitting a “sense of
place” and by providing a forum for communities to engage in a dialog about what matters most
to them. 101 Non-profit organizations provide a number of services to the community, including
education, relief from poverty, religious services, and legal services. Further, both of these goals
have been recognized as legitimate ends of government. Historic preservation and regulation for
aesthetics have been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power, which is broad enough to
allow government to ensure that the community is “beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” 102 Decisions to support organizations
with charitable purposes through measures such as tax exemption have been upheld as bearing
rational relationship to a legitimate state goal. 103 Importantly, it is also within the discretion of
legislatures to prioritize between the ends it wishes to achieve. 104
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A. Should cities adopt a lesser standard of economic hardship for non-profits?
A close examination of takings law reveals that no “easier” standard has been created for
non-profits. Some city councils and courts have thought, however, that non-profits present a
sufficiently unique problem in takings questions to merit special analysis. The constitutional
standard, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, provides a baseline that every government entity
in the United States must follow. This, however, does not preclude local government from
agreeing to compensate more frequently than the national standard.
Should local governments identify a regulatory burden, less than a “taking,” from which
non-profits deserve relief? In support, society may receive a greater net benefit from non-profits
if they can direct as many funds as possible toward their organizational missions. Excusing them
from dedicating funds to historically compatible upkeep and expansion of their properties would
free up those funds..
Conversely, most jurisdictions have no difficulty applying the “no viable economic use”
or “no reasonable return” standard to both non-profit and for-profit entities. This may be the
more rational approach. Even though non-profits by definition re-dedicate any profits earned
back to their organizational mission, they work hard to generate as much funding as possible. In
this light, non-profits are not far removed in terms of their investment-backed expectations from
commercial property owners. There are many non-profit organizations that have far greater
operating budgets than, say, a small “mom-and-pop” store, who might garner an equal amount of
sympathy if denial of a demolition permit forced it to move to a less expensive location.
Individual cases of both non-profits and for-profits facing financial burdens under historic
preservation laws can be found that would garner emotional support, but sympathy alone cannot

other’ and since the apple industry [at issue in Miller] was important in the State involved greater value to the
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be the basis of a legal standard. A rational analysis of the pressures applying to non-profit and
commercial landowners reveals that each faces similar challenges in owning property subject to
a historic preservation law.
Additionally, the takings standard in “economic hardship” provisions is designed to allow
exceptions only in fairly rare cases where the property has actually been rendered useless by the
regulation. This is sensible, because governments have limited resources with which to effect
policies. If burdened landowners could circumvent historic preservation laws often, the laws
would lose their effectiveness. Courts have routinely upheld, however, that some landowners
will bear a greater burden than others to secure a benefit to the public as a whole. 105 For instance,
the Penn Central court stated that
[i]t is true, as appellants emphasize, that… landmark laws apply only to selected parcels.
But, contrary to appellants' suggestions, landmark laws are not like discriminatory, or
“reverse spot,” zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones…In
contrast…the New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures
of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city, and as noted,
over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been designated pursuant to this
plan. 106
Historic preservation is fully within the government’s power to promote and can provide
significant benefits to the community, but those benefits are only secured if the government has
given itself the power to enforce the law effectively. Diminutions of that power should not be
implemented without much careful consideration.
Further, while it is possible and laudable for government to adopt policies to free nonprofits from as many financial burdens as possible, historic preservation laws are not the only
way to accomplish this. The tax exemptions available to non-profit organizations already secure
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significant benefit for these organizations. It is quite possible that lawmakers enacting historic
preservation laws felt this benefit already adequately addressed any special concerns for nonprofits.
Finally it is equally possible that historic preservation can benefit as well as burden nonprofits with historic properties. For instance, a booming real estate market might create
enormous pressure on owners of historic properties, which typically do not fill the entire
envelope allowed in their zoning districts, to sell to developers. 107 In these instances,
landmarking or historic districting might make the property less attractive to developers,
allowing the non-profit to continue operations insulated from the ups and downs of market
pressures. Alternatively, even if non-profits are pressured to sell because the financial or
physical burden is too great in their current, historic location, historic preservation can increase
the value of land. The higher price the organization could receive for the land may even
outweigh any costs of having to change locations. 108 Non-profits could also leverage their
location in creative ways, such as selling the transferrable development rights above their roofs
to new construction properties. 109 These examples illustrate at least that the effects of historic
preservation laws on non-profit owners might be too varied to justify relief based on a lesser
showing than required for commercial properties.
B. There is a need to clarify what evidence is required for owners to meet the takings standard.
It is within legislative discretion to choose whether to address the concerns with
modifications in ‘takings” law for non-profits. No such modification is recommended, however.
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Non-profits are difficult to distinguish from commercial properties in land ownership, they
already benefit from tax relief, government’s resources are limited, and historic preservation may
help as well as hurt non-profits. However, from the varied case law on the topic, one important
improvement in the body of law on the subject suggests itself: a clarified, perhaps statutory
statement of what an owner seeking to make a hardship claim must prove in order to prevail. In
the New York statute and in the courts of Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia, owners
must show that their properties would not even be able to be sold without receiving a permit for
demolition, alteration or new construction. While this is a fairly clear requirement of plaintiffs,
two main flaws exist. First, this standard does not address the organization who does not want to
sell, unless they offer their property on the market for the sole purpose of generating proof for
their claim. Second, as addressed most clearly in St. Bartholomew, creative lawyering should
mean that no takings claim of financial exhaustion of the non-profit owner’s resources may ever
succeed. There will always be one more method of raising funds that could be dreamt up that
even a plaintiff making a good faith effort to raise funds may not have attempted.
Additionally, the District of Columbia Historic Preservation Act lists evidence that must
be produced before a Mayor’s Agent hearing raising an economic hardship claim. The showing
includes the following:
(A) For all property: (i) The amount paid for the property, the date of purchase and the
party from whom purchased, including a description of the relationship, if any, between
the owner and the person from whom the property was purchased; (ii) The assessed value
of the land and improvements thereon according to the two most recent assessments; (iii)
Real estate taxes for the previous two years; (iv) Annual debt service, if any, for the
previous two years; (v) All appraisals obtained within the previous two years by the
owner or applicant in connection with his purchase, financing or ownership of the
property; (vi) Any listing of the property for sale or rent, price asked, and offers received,
if any; and (vii)Any consideration by the owner as to profitable adaptive uses for the
property; and (B)For income-producing property: (i) Annual gross income from the
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property for the previous two years; (ii) Itemized operating and maintenance expenses for
the previous two years; (iii) Annual cash flow, if any, for the previous two years. 110

This list should ensure that ample evidence will be presented to support a decision, but it
provides no guidance on what facts will result in a finding of economic hardship.
The New York City Landmarks Law supplies a fixed amount, at which “no reasonable
return” is set. The six percent figure, while somewhat arbitrary, is the best example of a clearly
stated standard by which property owners can measure their burden. 111
Therefore, it is proposed that historic preservation ordinances with economic hardship
provisions could be amended by adding a provision such as the following: “economic hardship”
will occur when the effect of the regulation amounts to a taking without just compensation under
the Constitution, to be demonstrated by either (a) inability to utilize the property in the uses to
which it has been put by the current owner, such that the currently available resources of the
owner are exhausted; and (b) inability to sell the property; or (c) that the return on the property is
less than six percent of the property’s value free of the regulation, or a similar fixed percentage
that would render the return negligible.” Like almost any standard, this leaves room for some
interpretation by courts. The goal of a standard like this, however, is to make as clear as possible
to landowners just how great the burden of a regulation must be to reach a taking. Such certainty
would limit the total number of claims asserted in court, because landowners could better judge
for themselves whether their burden rises to the level of a taking. Certainty would also increase
the number of meritorious claims as a portion of the whole that are brought to court, and it would
encourage consistency in the outcomes of takings cases.
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